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JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated §78-2a-3(2)(k) and pursuant to the order of 
the Utah Supreme Court dated September 16, 1993 transferring this 
matter from the Supreme Court to the Court of Appeals for 
disposition. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Whether or not the lower court properly ruled that the 
permissive use by defendants1 predecessor of a hand built 
irrigation ditch across plaintiff's property did not ripen into 
an adverse prescriptive easement in favor of defendants. 
2. Whether or not the verbal permission given to 
defendants1 predecessor by the owner of the servient estate to 
construct and use an irrigation ditch across the servient estate 
is contractually deficient and in violation of the statute of 
frauds. 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The issues appealed by defendants were submitted to the 
court on cross motions for summary judgment. With minor 
exceptions, the facts were undisputed below. On appeal the court 
reviews the trial court's conclusions of law for correctness 
without any particular deference given to the trial court. 
Richards v. Security Pacific National Bank, 849 P.2d 606 (Utah 
App. 1993). 
1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES 
AND REGULATIONS 
Utah Code Annotated (1943) §33-5-1 
No estate or interest in real property, other than 
leases for a term not exceeding one year, nor any trust 
or power over or concerning real property or in any 
matter relating thereto, shall be created, granted, 
assigned, surrendered or declared otherwise than by act 
or operation of law or by deed or conveyance in writing 
subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning, 
surrendering or declaring the same, or by his lawful 
agent thereunto authorized by writing. 
Utah Code Annotated (1943) §101-4-2 
The property, both real and personal, of one who dies 
without disposing of it by will, passes to the heirs of 
the intestate, subject to the control of the court, and 
to the possession of any administrator appointed by the 
court for the purposes of administration. 
Utah Code Annotated (1943) §102-11-5 
Actions for the recovery of any property, real or 
personal, or for the possession thereof, or to quiet 
title thereto, or to determine any adverse claim 
thereon, and all actions founded upon contracts, may be 
maintained by and against executors and administrators 
in all cases in which the same might have been 
maintained by or against their respective testators or 
intestates. 
Utah Code Annotated (1953) §57-1-6, Repealed by Laws 1988 
Every conveyance of real estate, and every instrument 
of writing setting forth an agreement to convey any 
real estate or whereby any real estate may be affected, 
to operate as notice to third persons shall be proved 
or acknowledged and certified in the manner prescribed 
by this title and recorded in the office of the 
recorder of the county in which such real estate is 
situated, but shall be valid and binding between the 
parties thereto without such proofs, acknowledgment, 
certification or record, and as to all other persons 
who have had actual notice. Neither the fact that an 
instrument, recorded as herein provided, recites only a 
nominal consideration, nor the fact that the grantee in 
such instrument is designated as trustee, or that the 
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conveyance otherwise purports to be in trust without 
naming the beneficiaries or stating the terms of the 
trust, shall operate to charge any third person with 
notice of the interest of any person or persons not 
named in such instrument or of the grantor or grantors; 
but the grantee may convey the fee or such lesser 
interest as was conveyed to him by such instrument free 
and clear of all claims not disclosed by the instrument 
or by an instrument recorded as herein provided setting 
forth the names of the beneficiaries, specifying the 
interest claimed and describing the property charged 
with such interest. 
Utah Code Annotated (1953) §57-3-2(3) 
This section does not affect the validity of a document 
with respect to the parties to the document and all 
other persons who have notice of the document. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff (as used herein, plaintiff refers to Duane Green) 
brought this action to enjoin defendants from entering upon 
plaintiff's land to affect the flow of water onto or across 
plaintiff's land and for damages caused by the battery of 
plaintiff by defendants. (Record at 10-14). Defendants 
counterclaimed to establish by declaratory judgment a right in 
water superior to plaintiff and declaring a permanent easement 
across plaintiff's land for the purpose of conveying water, and 
for damages for plaintiff's purported interference with the water 
flowing across plaintiff's land. (Record at 17-19). 
PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW 
Plaintiff moved for summary judgment on the issue of 
defendant's claim to an easement and for an order enjoining 
defendants from interfering with the flow of water onto 
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plaintiff's land. (Record at 43-50). Defendants moved for 
summary judgment to establish their purported easement and to 
defeat plaintiff's claim to an injunction. (Record at 57-66). 
By memorandum decision, the lower court granted plaintiff's 
motion for summary judgment and denied defendant's motion for 
summary judgment. (Record at 93-94). The court also entered 
findings of fact, conclusions of law and a decree pursuant to 
said decision. (Record at 107-111). The court found that 
defendants did not have an easement across plaintiff's property 
and enjoined them from engaging in any activity calculated or 
intended to direct or control the flow of water onto, over or 
across plaintiff's property. (Record at 108, 111). The 
remaining claims of the parties were dismissed pursuant to court 
order dated May 21, 1993. (Record at 136). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Exhibit "A" included in the addendum hereto is a true 
and correct copy of the Utah County Plat depicting the property 
subject of this litigation and illustrating the location of the 
ditch which is the subject of this litigation. (Record at 50, 
66, 67, 70). Exhibit "B" included in the addendum hereto is a 
hand-drawn depiction of Exhibit "A" which is not to scale. (See 
Appellant's Brief, p. 5) 
2. Defendants Joe and Bill Stansfield are the owners of a 
one-half (1/2) interest in a seven-eighths (7/8) interest in 
69.40 acres of land shown on Exhibit "A" as Parcel N274-A. 
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(Record at 66). 
3. Plaintiff is a contract purchaser of and is in 
possession of certain real property depicted on Exhibit "A" as 
Parcel N390-B. The real property shown on Exhibit "A" as Parcel 
N390-A was at the inception of this action owned by Hazel M. 
Jensen, Howard G. Miller, Jake A. Sorensen and Virginia H. 
Horton. (Record at 49, 65). 
4. The real property shown on Exhibit "A" as Parcel N390-C 
is owned by Glen Jensen. (Record at 49, 65). 
5. Howard Miller and his father farmed Parcel N390-A from 
1946 to 1958. (Record at 49, 65). 
6. From 1958 until 1978, Howard Miller farmed Parcel N390-
A. (Record at 49, 65). 
7. Since 1976, Howard Miller has owned an interest in 
Parcel N390-A. (Record at 49, 65). 
8. Since 1978, Parcel 390-A has been farmed by various 
lessees of Howard Miller. (Record at 48, 65). 
9. In 1947 or 1948, Howard Miller and his father 
constructed the ditch shown on Exhibit "A". The ditch started on 
Parcel N390-A and then traversed the northernmost portions of 
Parcels N390-C and N390-B before entering Parcel N274-A. (Record 
at 65). 
10. Parcel N390-C has been owned by Glen Jensen since 1948. 
Parcel N390-B was owned by Harold Jensen until his death on 
September 3, 1951 and was purchased by plaintiff from the 
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surviving spouse of Harold Jensen, Melba P. Jensen, on August 1, 
1977. (Record at 48, 65). 
11. When Howard Miller and his father constructed the ditch 
shown on Exhibit "A" attached hereto, they obtained the consent 
of the owners of the property, Harold Jensen as to parcel N390-B 
and Glen Jensen as to Parcel N390-C. (Record at 48, 65). 
12. Howard Miller owned 24-5/6th shares of stock in Goshen 
Irrigation and Canal Company, evidence by Certificate 574, which 
he used to irrigate Parcel N390-A. (Record at 49, 65). 
13. The water right evidenced by Certificate 574 usually 
entitled the owner to more than sufficient water to irrigate 
Parcel N390-A. (Record at 48, 65). 
14. Excess water from Certificate 574 and runoff water 
draining from Parcel N390-A has been carried through the ditch 
across Parcels N390-C and N390-B to irrigate Parcel N274-A. 
(Record at 48, 65-65). 
15. The water represented by Certificate 574 is not 
appurtenant to Parcel N390-A. (Record at 48, 47, 64). 
16. Melba Jensen was appointed as the administratrix of the 
estate of Harold Jensen and Parcel N390-B was distributed to her 
pursuant to court decree dated April 10, 1980. (Record at 119-
121). 
17. Neither Howard Miller nor any other party has given 
notice to Melba Jensen or to any other owner, prior to this 
litigation, of a claim of right to use the subject ditch to 
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transport water to Parcel N274-A, nor did Howard Miller ever 
obtain permission from Melba Jensen to use the ditch. (Record at 
64). 
18. Defendants Joe Stansfield and Bill Stansfield acquired 
their interests in Parcel N274-A from Howard Miller. (Record at 
64). 
19. When Howard Miller sold Parcel N274-A to defendants Joe 
Stansfield and Bill Stansfield, he showed them the subject ditch 
and indicated to them that they could use the ditch to convey 
water to Parcel N274-A. (Record at 64). 
20. Defendants own water in the Goshen Irrigation and Canal 
Company which is available to them to run across the subject 
ditch to water Parcel N274-A. (Record at 64). 
21. The subject ditch is the only available means to 
provide water to Parcel N274-A. (Record at 69). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The lower court found that defendants had not met their 
burden in establishing a prescriptive easement over plaintiff's 
property, described on Exhibit "A" attached hereto as Parcel 
N390-B, and that plaintiff was entitled to an injunction against 
defendants prohibiting them from interfering with the flow of 
water onto or across plaintiff's property. (Record at 107-111). 
The evidence below was presented by statement of facts submitted 
by both plaintiff and defendants which are, for the most part, 
uncontested. The statements of fact were based upon the 
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deposition of Howard Miller and upon affidavits submitted by 
plaintiff and defendants. 
It is undisputed that Howard Miller, defendants' 
predecessor-in-interest, constructed the irrigation ditch which 
is the subject of this litigation, with the consent of the then 
owner of Parcel N390-B, Harold Jensen. (Record at 65). The 
evidence is also undisputed that neither Mr. Miller nor 
defendants asked permission of any subsequent owners of Parcel 
N390-B to use the ditch and there is no evidence that notice was 
given to Harold Jensen or any subsequent owners of Parcel N390-B 
that the permissive use of the subject ditch was being renounced 
and that a claim of right to the ditch was being asserted. 
(Record at 48, 65). 
The case law in this jurisdiction as well as neighboring 
jurisdictions is clear that once a use has been established as 
permissive, the burden is upon the claimant to show that the use 
has become adverse to the owner of the servient estate by notice 
to the owner of the servient estate that the claimant is 
renouncing his permissive use of the same and is making a claim 
of right to an easement. Richins v. Struhs, 17 Utah 2d 356, 412 
P.2d 314 (1966); Lunt v. Kitchens, 123 Utah 488, 260 P.2d 535 
(Utah 1953). Wiedman v. Trinity Evangelical Lutheran Church, 610 
P.2d 1149 (Mont. 1980). Defendants have not met their burden of 
establishing the adverse character of their use of the subject 
ditch by notice to the owners of Parcel N390-B of a claim of 
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right to use the same. Consequently, their claim to a 
prescriptive easement fails. 
Defendants' also claim an easement to use the subject ditch 
as a result of a verbal, unrecorded grant from Harold Jensen. 
Their claim is based upon Utah Code Annotated §57-1-6 and §57-3-
2, relating to notice of written, unrecorded agreements. In this 
case, defendants' claim to a verbal easement is not substantiated 
by the facts and does not satisfy the requirements of the statute 
of frauds, Utah Code Annotated (1943) §33-5-1. 
Defendants have not submitted any evidence, other than the 
initial consent to the construction and use of the ditch by the 
then owner of Parcel N390-B, Harold Jensen, to establish that 
such consent amounted to a verbal grant of an easement and that 
there has been part performance thereunder sufficient to satisfy 
an exception to the statute of frauds. The small ditch was built 
by Howard Miller and his father using shovels and is not of a 
permanent nature. (See Appellants' Brief, p. 11). Therefore, 
defendants' alternative basis for establishing an easement across 
plaintiff's property is ineffective and the lower court properly 
denied defendants' motion for summary judgment and properly 
granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment enjoining 





DEFENDANTS HAVE NOT MET THEIR BURDEN OF PROVING THAT 
THE INITIAL PERMISSIVE USE OF THE SUBJECT DITCH 
BECAME ADVERSE AS TO SUBSEQUENT OWNERS FOR THE 
PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD OF TWENTY YEARS 
A. Because it is Undisputed that the Initial Construction 
and Use of the Subject Ditch was by Permission of the Owner of 
the Servient Estate, Harold Jensen, the Burden Shifts to 
Defendants to Establish that the Use Subsequently Became Adverse. 
In 1947 or 1948, defendants1 predecessor-in-interest, Howard 
Miller, asked permission from plaintiff's predecessor-in-
interest, Harold Jensen, to construct a ditch for the purpose of 
transporting water from Parcel N390-A to Parcel N274-A as shown 
on Exhibits A and B hereto. Mr. Jensen consented to that 
request. Based on that consent, in 1947 or 1948 Howard Miller 
and his father constructed a small ditch across a portion of 
plaintiff's property using shovels. (See Appellants' Brief, p. 
11). Since obtaining the consent of Harold Jensen to construct 
the ditch, neither defendants nor their predecessors-in-interest 
asked permission of any subsequent owners to use the ditch nor 
did they claim the use of the ditch as a matter of right. 
Defendantsf first argument is that they have acquired a 
right to use and maintain the ditch by prescriptive easement. 
"In order to establish a prescriptive easement" defendants "must 
establish a use that is (1) open, (2) notorious, (3) adverse, and 
(4) continuous for at least 20 years." Marchant v. Park City, 
788 P.2d 520 (Utah 1990). 
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Defendants' claim to a prescriptive easement fails primarily 
because defendants are unable to satisfy the requirement of 
adverse use. Because it is undisputed that Howard Miller was 
given permission by the then owner of the property, Harold 
Jensen, to construct and use the subject ditch, the burden is 
upon defendants to show that the initial permissive use became 
adverse and that the adverse use continued for a period of at 
least twenty (20) years. Richins v. Struhs, 17 Utah 2d 356, 412 
P.2d 314, 316 (1966) (If the owner of the servient estate is able 
to show that the initial use was by permission, "the burden of 
going forward with evidence and of ultimate persuasion shifts 
back to the claimant to show that the use became adverse and 
continued for the prescriptive period"). 
B. Possession and Control of the Servient Estate Belonged 
to Harold Jensen or his Estate from the Time the Ditch was 
Created Until 1980. 
Although Harold Jensen died on September 3, 1951, his estate 
was not distributed until April 10, 1980. (Record at 120-121). 
Under Utah Code Annotated (1943) §101-4-2, in effect at the time 
of death of Harold Jensen in 1951, fee title to the property 
vested in the heirs of Harold Jensen upon his death, subject to 
administration. However, possession of the property belonged to 
the administratrix of his estate until distribution in 1980. 
That section reads as follows: 
The property, both real and personal, of one who dies 
without disposing of it by will, passes to the heirs of the 
intestate, subject to the control of the court, and to the 
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possession of any administrator appointed by the court 
for the purposes of administration. 
In In re Jones Estate, 99 Utah 373, 104 P.2d 210 (Utah 
1940), the court construed Revised Statutes 1933, §101-4-2, which 
is identical to §101-4-2 in the 1943 code, stating: 
Our statute is entirely clear that title to property of an 
intestate passes to his heirs upon his death subject to 
divestment for debts and expenses. All the administrator 
gets is possession. In the instant case, therefore, upon 
his death, all of the decedent's estate passed to his heir 
(his mother) subject to the control of the court and to the 
possession of the Administratrix. 
104 P.2d 213. Consequently, possession and control of the 
servient estate, Parcel N390-B, was in Harold Jensen or his 
estate until 1980. Obviously, the prescriptive period of twenty 
years has not elapsed since then. Utah Code Annotated (1943) 
§102-11-5 provides that an action for the recovery of real 
property by or against an administrator of the estate of an 
intestate is founded on the same rights that the intestate would 
have had. That section reads as follows: 
Actions for the recovery of any property, real or 
personal, or for the possession thereof, or to quiet 
title thereto, or to determine any adverse claim 
thereon, and all actions founded upon contracts, may be 
maintained by and against executors and administrators 
in all cases in which the same might have been 
maintained by or against their respective testators or 
intestates. 
Consequently, the permission granted by Harold Jensen continues 
in effect as against the administrator of his estate unless and 
until notice is given to the administrator of the estate of an 
adverse claim of right as more fully discussed below. There 
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having been no notice given to the administrator in this case, a 
prescriptive period could not have commenced herein until after 
distribution of the estate in 1980. 
C. Defendants Have Failed to Carry Their Burden of Proving 
the Adverse Use of the Subject Ditch and that Notice of the 
Adverse Character of the Use was Given to the Owner of the 
Servient Estate. 
It is defendants' contention that at the death of Harold 
Jensen in 1951, Ipso facto the use became adverse as to all 
subsequent owners. Defendants do not cite any authority for that 
contention and, in fact, it is contrary to well-established law. 
In 25 Am Jur 2d Easements and Licenses §54 and §55, the general 
rule is stated as follows: 
Use by express or implied permission or license, no 
matter how long continued, cannot ripen into an 
easement by prescription. Furthermore, if the original 
use by the claimant is by permission, it is presumed to 
so continue. 
*** 
To transform a permissive use into an adverse one, 
however, there must be a distinct and positive 
assertion of a right hostile to the rights of the 
owner, which is brought to his attention, and the 
adverse user must be for the full period required to 
acquire such right, excluding the time during which the 
user was permissive. 
The Utah Supreme Court followed that general rule in Lunt v. 
Kitchens, 123 Utah 488, 262 P.2d 535 (Utah 1953). In reversing 
the lower court and in finding that the claimant's use of the 
servient estate was not adverse to the owner thereof, the court 
stated: 
If, of course, the land owner consents to the use of his 
land, then the right created is a license and a prescriptive 
13 
right cannot arise from a license unless the licensee 
renounces openly his claim under the license. 
*** 
...[I]t is obvious where a special relationship such as a 
license exists, the owner of the land is entitled to more 
notice than the mere use of his land not inconsistent with 
the license. 
*** 
Since the use is presumed to have been with consent in 1920, 
unless respondents in the present case presented sufficient 
evidence to show that it became adverse and that the claim 
of use against permission was known to the Weidners 
[owners], the decree of the lower court must be reversed. 
260 P.2d 537, 538. 
In Wiedman v. Trinity Evangelical Lutheran Church, 610 P.2d 
1149 (Mont. 1980), the court held the use of certain real 
property not to be adverse under facts similar to those in the 
present case. The plaintiff in that case purchased real property 
anticipating that property adjacent to hers would be dedicated as 
a public street. Her home was built in anticipation of the 
dedication so that the garage entrance faced what was to be the 
future street. When the developer of the subdivision decided not 
to dedicate the subject property, the developer approached the 
plaintiff with an offer to sell the property to her. Plaintiff 
did not buy the property and it was subsequently sold to her 
neighbor to the north, Mr. Scovel. Mr. Scovel granted permission 
to the plaintiff to use the subject property as access to her 
home. Mr. Scovel subsequently sold the property to the 
defendant. The defendant planned to expand its school facilities 
and to place a fence and curbing around the subject property so 
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as to interfere with plaintiff's access to her home. In holding 
that the plaintiff had not established a prescriptive easement, 
the court stated: 
When a party's use of property is permissive at its 
inception, the use cannot ripen into a prescriptive right 
unless there is a later distinct assertion of a right 
hostile to the owner, which is brought to the attention of 
the owner and the use is continued for the full prescriptive 
period. 
The above discussion shows that Ms. Wiedman's [the 
plaintiff's] use of the disputed property was initially 
permissive. Before her use of the property could become 
hostile and eventually ripen into a prescriptive right, Ms. 
Wiedman would have had to make some positive assertion of 
the hostile nature of her use of the property and bring the 
fact of her hostile use to the attention of the owner of the 
property. The record is totally devoid of any such action 
by Ms. Wiedman. She testified that she and Mr. Scovel did 
not discuss her use of the property after their conversation 
in which he granted her permission to use the property. The 
evidence also shows that Ms. Wiedman never discussed her use 
of the property with the owners of Trinity Evangelical 
Lutheran Church [defendant]. Ms. Wiedman's use of the 
property was thus permissive at its inception and continued 
to be so until the time she initiated this action. 
610 P.2d 1152. 
In the present case, there is no evidence that defendants or 
their predecessors-in-interest ever renounced their permissive 
right to use the subject ditch, nor is there any evidence that 
defendants or their predecessors-in-interest gave notice to the 
owner of the servient estate of a claim of right to use the ditch 
so as to begin a period of adverse use. Defendants' sole 
argument on this issue is that by reason of the death of Harold 
Jensen, an adverse use began as against subsequent owners without 
the necessity of any notice of a claim of right to the subsequent 
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owners of the property. A similar argument was soundly rejected 
by the court in the City of Anchorage v. Nesbett, 530 P.2d 1324 
(Alaska 1975). Therein the court stated: 
It is true that the conveyance of a servient estate will in 
most cases constitute a basis for terminating a license. 
But such an implied revocation, without more, does not ipso 
facto transform a permissive use into an adverse one. 
530 P.2d 1329. The court then quoted from Sturnick v. Watson, 
336 Mass. 139, 142 N.E. 2d 896 (1957) as follows: 
"It doubtless is the law that a license to use another's 
land is revocable not only at the will of the owner of the 
property on which it is to be exercised, but by alienation 
of the land by him. But it does not follow that if the 
licensee continues to use the land as before, such use is 
necessarily adverse to the new owner. Whether the use after 
the conveyance was permissive or adverse was a question of 
fact and on this issue, the plaintiff [claimant] had the 
burden of proof." (Omitting citations). 
530 P.2d 1330. 
The Alaska Supreme Court followed the holding in Sturnick v. 
Watson, and also quoted with approval from Scheller v. Pierce 
County, 55 Wash. 298, 104 P. 277 (1909), in establishing the 
standard requisite to convert a permissive use to an adverse use: 
"If permissive at its inception, then such permissive 
character being stamped on the use at the outset, will 
continue of the same nature, and no adverse user can arise 
until a distinct and positive assertion of a right hostile 
to the owner, and brought home to him, can transform a 
subordinate and friendly holding into one of an opposite 
nature, and exclusive and independent in its character." 
530 P.2d 1330. In Scheller v. Pierce County, supra, the original 
use of the subject property was with permission which continued 
for a period of five years. The mere fact that the servient 
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estate changed hands did not transform the use from permissive to 
adverse. 
In the present case, defendants have presented no evidence 
to sustain their burden of proof on the issue of adverse use 
after the death of Harold Jensen. The facts which defendants 
rely upon to establish their easement, as stated at page 13 of 
their brief, are as follows: 
Harold Jensen died in 1951. Upon his death, his ownership 
of the property necessarily ceased. The new owners never 
gave their permission to use the ditch. Therefore, the 
prescriptive easement began to run in 1951 and vested in 
1971. 
At page 14 of their brief, defendants recognize that they have 
not met their burden to establish the adverse use of the ditch as 
against subsequent owners: 
In the case at bar, the initial owner of the land gave 
permission to use the land. The subsequent owners didn't. 
Permissive or hostile use as to subsequent owners is an open 
issue and is a material question of fact which precludes 
summary judgment. 
Defendants' failure to produce evidence does not raise a 
genuine issue of material fact which would preclude summary 
judgment. The evidence is that the initial construction and use 
of the ditch were with the consent and permission of the owner, 
Harold Jensen. Harold Jensen died in 1951. No notice of a claim 
of right was given to any subsequent owner. Consequently, under 
Lunt v. Kitchens, supra, and the other cases cited above, 
defendants' claim to an easement by prescription fails regardless 
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of whether Harold Jensen's estate or his heirs are deemed to have 
owned or possessed Parcel N390-B after his death. 
Defendants reliance on Richins v. Struhs, supra, is 
misplaced and misstated. In that case, two brothers-in-law owned 
adjoining properties in Emigration Canyon and jointly constructed 
a lane and bridge to access their properties. The court 
specifically found that the use of the lane and bridge was not 
permissive, but on the contrary, found that each of the parties 
adversely used the other's portion of the lane as access. The 
court stated: 
In order for the use to be permissive, it would have to 
appear that the parties understood that the driveway was 
upon the Whipple's (defendant's predecessors) property; that 
it was with this understanding that they gave their consent 
to its use; and similarly that the Joneses (plaintiffs' 
predecessors) so understood and accepted and used it. No 
such view of the facts is warranted by the evidence. On the 
contrary, when it is considered in the light of the 
principles of law and equity herein discussed, it is our 
opinion that the reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the 
facts here shown, where the parties (predecessors) jointly 
established and used a driveway on what they thought their 
common boundary, is that the use meets the requirement of 
being open, notorious, continuous and adverse for more than 
20 years, and therefore has established a prescriptive right 
to continue to so use it. 
412 P.2d 316, 317. 
In this case, it is undisputed that the initial use was 
permissive, thereby placing on defendants the burden of proving 
that the use became adverse and that notice of the adverse use 




THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT ESTABLISH A VERBAL AGREEMENT 
BY HAROLD JENSEN TO CONVEY AN EASEMENT TO 
PLAINTIFF, WHICH, IN ANY EVENT, WOULD 
VIOLATE THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
As an alternative to the claimed right to use the subject 
ditch under prescriptive easement, defendants argue that the 
permission granted by Harold Jensen to Howard Miller to construct 
and use the ditch constituted a verbal grant of an unrecorded 
easement. In so arguing, defendants rely upon cases construing 
former Utah Code Annotated §57-1-6 and current §57-3-2(2) 
relating to notice of unrecorded documents. Those sections, 
however, only address written documents creating rights as 
between the parties thereto. Defendants have not submitted any 
evidence of an agreement between Mr. Miller and Mr. Jensen. At 
best, the permission granted by Mr. Jensen constituted a mere 
license to Mr. Miller to use Parcel N390-B to construct a ditch 
to transport water. There is no evidence of a "meeting of the 
minds" to convey an easement from Mr. Jensen to Mr. Miller, nor 
is there evidence of any consideration given therefor. Southland 
Corp. v. Potter, 760 P.2d 320 (Utah App. 1988). 
Furthermore, defendants claim to a granted easement would 
violate the statute of frauds. Utah Code Annotated (1943) §33-5-
1, in effect at the time of the consent given by Harold Jensen to 
19 
construct the ditch and which is identical to current §25-5-1, 
provides: 
No estate or interest in real property, other than leases 
for a term not exceeding one year, nor any trust or power 
over or concerning real property or in any matter relating 
thereto, shall be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or 
declared otherwise than by act or operation of law or by 
deed or conveyance in writing subscribed by the party 
creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring the 
same, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized by 
writing. 
The statutes and cases cited by defendants are inapposite 
because they address notice to third persons of existing rights 
between the parties to an agreement, whereas, in this case, no 
enforceable agreement has come into existence because defendants' 
claim does not satisfy the statute of frauds. 
In an analogous case, Wells v. Marcus, 25 Utah 2d 242, 480 
P.2d 129 (1971), the Utah Supreme Court rejected a claim to an 
easement based on an oral grant. In that case, the parties 
predecessors-in-interest worked together in constructing a 
pipeline to convey creek water in a common pipe to a point of 
division and then in separate pipes to their respective 
residences. In denying an easement to defendants, the court 
stated: 
The right sought by the defendants to maintain a pipeline 
across the plaintiff's land would be an easement, and thus 
and interest in land. It being without dispute that there 
has been no written conveyance, the defendants1 claim would 
normally be defeated by the Statute of Frauds. 
480 P.2d at 130. The court noted an exception to the general 
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rule as stated in 1 Thompson, Real Property, Sec. 356 (Perm. Ed. 
1939): 
"Under the equitable doctrine of part performance, a 
verbal agreement for an easement has been enforced by some 
courts. This doctrine applies to all cases in which a court 
of equity would entertain a suit for specific performance if 
the alleged contract had been in writing. 
*** 
If expenditures be made in permanent improvements 
inuring to the benefit of a licensor under an express 
oral license given by him, then such license becomes 
irrevocable, and, if it relates to the use or 
occupation of real estate, it becomes and easement. 
480 P.2d 130. The court found that in that case the evidence did 
not sustain the finding of part or full performance in reliance 
on the verbal agreement. In the present case, defendants have 
not produced any evidence of full or part performance based on 
the consent given by Harold Jensen to Howard Miller to construct 
a ditch, nor is there any evidence of the permanent nature of the 
ditch. In fact, the evidence is that the ditch is small and was 
constructed by Howard Miller and his father using shovels. 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 11). There is no evidence that any 
permanent improvement has been made thereto. 
Finally, defendants contend that there is a factual issue as 
to plaintiff's notice of the subject ditch. That assertion, 
however, begs the question of what effect notice of the existence 
of the ditch would have on defendants1 right to an easement. 
Assuming, argruendo, that plaintiff had notice of the ditch at the 
time he acquired Parcel N390-B, because defendants did not have a 
right to an easement at the time plaintiff acquired the property, 
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either by prescription or by grant, any such notice is 
immaterial. Observance of the existence of the ditch does not 
create in defendants a right to an easement where none 
theretofore existed. In any event, defendants cannot rely upon 
their own failure to produce evidence of notice to plaintiff in 
order to create a factual question as to an issue upon which they 
had the burden of proof. 
The evidence, and the foregoing authority, clearly 
demonstrates that defendants are not entitled to an easement 
across plaintiff's property pursuant to a purported unrecorded 
verbal grant from Harold Jensen. Therefore, defendants claim to 
an easement was properly denied by the lower court. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the subject ditch in this case was constructed and 
used by Howard Miller with the consent of the owner of Parcel 
N390-B, Harold Jensen, a presumption is created that the use 
continues as permissive until such time as the claimant renounces 
his permissive use and notifies the owner of the servient estate 
of his claim of right to use of the ditch. In this case there 
has been no evidence presented to rebut the presumption of 
continued permissive use of the ditch and consequently 
defendants' claim for an easement across plaintiffs' property was 
properly denied by the trial court. The foregoing presumption 
and result applies whether the owner of the servient estate was 
Harold Jensen, his estate, his surviving spouse, or plaintiff. 
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This matter was submitted to the court on cross motions for 
summary judgment on essentially undisputed facts. There is no 
evidence of an agreement on the part of Harold Jensen to convey 
an easement and there is no evidence that the subject ditch is 
such a permanent improvement so as to create an irrevocable 
license in favor of defendants1 predecessor-in-interest or to 
create an exception to the statute of frauds. Consequently, the 
lower court properly found that no verbal conveyance of an 
easement was made by Harold Jensen. 
Based upon the foregoing, the court properly granted 
plaintiffs1 motion for summary judgment in enjoining defendants 
from effecting the flow of water onto or across plaintiffs1 land, 
and properly denied defendants' motion for summary judgment to 
establish a prescriptive easement. Therefore, plaintiff 
respectfully requests that the court affirm the decision of the 
lower court in all respects. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY 
********** 
DUANE GREEN, 
Plaintiff, Case Number 900400579 
-VS- RAY M. HARDING, JUDGE 
BOYD STANSFIELD, JOE STANDSFIELD 
and BILL STANSFIELD, 
Defendants. MEMORANDUM DECISION 
********** 
The Court denies defendants' request for oral 
argument based on its untimeliness pursuant to Rule 4-501, 
U.R.J.A. 
The Court having considered both parties' motions for 
summary judgment hereby grants plaintiff's motion for summary 
judgment and denies defendants'. The Court finds there are no 
genuine issues of material fact which would preclude such 
judgment and that plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. Rule 56, U.R.C.P. 
The Court finds that it is undisputed that Harold 
Jensen gave permission to defendants to build and use the 
irrigation ditch at issue. Such permission prevented the 
defendants from gaining a prescriptive easement for the time 
period during which Harold Jensen and his estate owned the 
property. Melba Jensen then acquired title to the property 
through inheritance in 1980 as shown by the Decree of 
Distribution In the Matter of the Estate of Harold Le Roy 
Jensen dated April 10, 1980. Whether Melba Jensen, as 
subsequent owner of the property, gave defendants permission 
to use the irrigation ditch or the defendants were using the 
ditch openly and notoriously since 1980 is irrelevant, since 
the time period of ten years or less is as a matter of law not 
long enough to establish a prescriptive easement in the 
irrigation ditch. 
The jury trial set for this matter on April 15th and 
16th at 9:00 a.m. is hereby stricken from the Court's calendar. 
Counsel for plaintiff to prepare an order consistent 
with the terms of this decision and submit it to opposing 
counsel for approval as to form prior to submission to the 
court for signature. This memorandum decision has no effect 
until such order is signed by the Court. 
Dated this 27th day of March, 1991. 
cc: Dallas H. Young, Esq. 
S. Junior Baker, Esq. 
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DALLAS H. YOUNG (3585) (991 APR I! $ & 02 
IVIE & YOUNG \/<^  
Attorneys for Plaintiff ^ * 
48 North University Avenue 
P.O. Box 672 
Provo, UT 84603 
Telephone: 375-3000 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUK7Y, 
STATE OF UTAH 
DUANE GREEN, ) 
Plaintiff, ) 
VS. ) FINDINGS OF FACT AN! 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
BOYD STANSFIELD, JOE STANSFIELD, ) 
and BILL STANSFIELD, ) Case No. 900400579 
) Judge Harding 
Defendants. ) 
Both parties to the above entitled action have submitted 
motions for summary judgment. 
1. It appears without dispute that the plaintiff is the 
contract purchaser and in possession of that parcel of property 
which has been designated as Parcel N390-B on the official plat 
kept by the Utah County Recorder in the County Recorder's office 
at Provo, Utah. Parcel N390-B is located in Section 3 of Township 
2 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base Meridian. On the official 
plat the property appears to be in the name of Melba P. Jensen. 
Allegations contained in the affidavits of the plaintiff which are 
admitted by the defendants show that the plaintiff is the contract 
purchaser of Parcel N390-B and is in possession thereof. 
2. The court finds that the affidavits on file anf the 
admissions contained in the pleadings establish the fact that a 
ditch exists which traverses the north end of Parcel N390-B in an 
east-west direction. 
3. The ditch described above has been used in the past to 
convey water from property heretofore owned by Howard G. Miller, 
Hazel M. Jensen, Waldo Sorensen, J. K. Sorensen as trustees and 
Virginia H. Horton across property now owned by Glen Jensen and 
Mildred Jensen which is shown on the Utah County Recorder's plat 
for Section 3, Township 10 South, Range 1 West as ParcelAG90-C and 
across parcelA/390-B for the purpose of irrigating land now owned 
by William Boyd Stansfield and Joseph Cly Stansfield which land is 
shown on the Utah County Recorder's office plat as Parcel N274-A.. 
4. The claim of the defendants asserted in defendants' 
counterclaim and in its motion for summary judgment to be entitled 
to outilize the ditch across parcelj/390-B was based upon a claimed 
prescriptive right. 
5. The maintenance of the ditch across Parcel N390-B by 
Howard Miller and his tenants and his co-owner's tenants was a 
permissive use at least as late as the 28th day of March, 1980. 
The defendants' predecessors in title having having maintained the 
ditch across ParcelAG90-B with the express permission of the owner 
thereof, Harold Jensen. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court now makes and 




CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
(1) The plaintiff's predecessors in title did not own a 
prescriptive right to maintain the irrigation ditch described in 
the Findings of Fact across the plaintiff's property identified as 
N390-B; 
(2) Plaintiff is entitled to an order from the court 
enjoining the defendants ai3 each of them from maintaining any 
ditch or structure to dirert or control the flow of water on or 
across the plaintiff's lanf; 
(3) Defendants' moti:n for summary judgment should be denied, 
Dated: April / O , 1991. 
BY THE COURT: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
rf%^ 
<TUttZ50R BAKER 
Attorney for Defendants 
IARDING, J u d g e
 <r^f 
green3 
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Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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Telephone: 375-3000 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY, 




BOYD STANSFIELD, JOE STANSFIELD, 
and BILL STANSFIELD, 
Defendants. 
DECREE 
Case No. 900400579 
Judge Harding 
Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
heretofore entered, the court now makes and enters the following: 
DECREE 
1. The defendants Boyd Stansfield, Joe Stansfield and Bill 
Stansfield are each permanently enjoined from engaging in any 
activity on that parcel of land described in the Findings of Fact 
as Parcel N-390-B in Section 3, Township 10 South, Range 1 West, 
Salt Lake Base Meridian which is calculated or intended or has as 
its purpose the directing or control of the flow of water onto, 
over or across said Parcel N-390-B. 
Dated: April /O , 1991. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
/U^*&**-> 
RAYrWtf-fiARDING, J u d g e 
MfB, /Z^ ^UNiqp^ BAKER 
Attorney for Defendants 
green3.5 
